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Abstract
This paper examines the issue of female political representation and the extent to which it
effects government health spending as a share of GDP in states with varying income
levels. First, the paper reviews and discusses the broad literature on determinants of
government health spending and the literature related to gender and health spending,
generally. Second, it tests whether female parliamentary representation can explain parts
of the variation in government health spending across countries and over time. To do so, it
uses country-level data and controls for known determinants of government health
spending. The results show that increased female parliamentary representation is
associated with higher government health spending. Moreover, this association remains
significant even after controlling for other determinants of government health spending,
indicating that that the effect may be partially causal. The results also indicate that if low-
and middle-income countries increased their share of women in parliaments by 10
percentage points, government health spending as a portion of GDP would, on average,
increase by between 10 and 12 percent. The corresponding figure for high-income
countries is around 5 percent. Overall, the analysis suggests that the level of female
representation in parliaments has significant effect on countries health spending.
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11. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
There is a wide variation in the extent to which government spending on health varies
across countries. In 2007, countries such as Myanmar and Azerbaijan spent less than 3
percent of their respective budgets on health. At the other end of the spectrum, Costa Rica
and Montenegro spent over 25% percent of their budgets on health. As share of GDP,
Myanmar and Pakistan spend less than 0.8% on health while Timor-Leste, Marshall
Islands, and Micronesia spend more than 10%1.
In line with the literature, there are several explanations for why government health
spending differs. While national income is a key determinant, other relevant factors found
in the literature include: political economy considerations, the prevalence of corruption,
governance, trade openness, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. These determinants will
be reviewed in the next section.
This paper explores whether gender has an effect on government health spending. Are
countries where gender equality is more pronounced more likely to invest in health,
controlling for other possible factors? To evaluate this notion, this paper will use simple
econometric approaches. Government health spending is measured as share of GDP, and
consist of public health spending, central and local budgets, external borrowing, grants,
and health insurance funds. The share of women in parliament is used as the measure of
gender parity.
Reviewing the cross sectional literature on what others have found to be relevant
determinants of government health spending, those determinants are used as control
variables to explore if gender could be a potential explanation on macro level government
health spending. But why look at gender?
1 Source: World Health Organization, National Health Accounts
2One prominent reason why gender could be seen to have an effect on government health
spending is seen from Figure 1. Data from 2006-2008 show on average, countries that are
progressive in women standing in political and economic forums, seem to possess a
strong relationship to governments that spend more on health as a portion of GDP.2 A
second reason is that studies done on intra-household level show gender affects
allocations. When a female decides, child health and health become prioritized.3 Even at a
sub national level studies suggest women provide more public goods (such as provision of
water sources), than their male counterparts.4 This suggests that gender has an effect on
health spending at the micro level. Few or no studies have been done at the macro level. A
third reason to explore this relationship is to see consequently whether micro-level results
are valid on the macro level. Using cross-sectional data this paper aims to answer: Is
gender a relevant factor in cross-country and within country empirical analysis of
government spending on health?
2 Definition: Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), is a measure of agency. It evaluates progress in
advancing women's standing in political and economic forums. It examines the extent to which women and
men are able to actively participate in economic and political life and take part in decision-making. While
the GDI focuses on expansion of capabilities, the GEM is concerned with the use of those capabilities to
take advantage of the opportunities of life.
3 Section 3.1brings forward the supported literature
4 Section 3.2brings forward the supported literature
3Figure 1. Gender Empowerment Measure (2006) vs. Government Spending on Health
as Proportion of GDP (average 2006-2008)
The remainder of the document is organized into seven sections. Section 2 reviews the
literature for the relevant factors determining government health spending across
countries. Section 3 reviews the literature on the role of gender related factors
determining allocations to health at a household and sub-national level. The fourth section
analysis the empirical data regarding the effect of gender on government health spending.
Section five presents the results from the cross and within country analysis on gender and
the relationship to government health spending. The final section concludes and discusses
policy implications.
42. DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT HEALTH
SPENDING: REVIEW OF THE CROSS-SECTIONAL
LITERATURE5
National income: National income is a key determinant of government spending on health
across countries. Wealthier countries tend to spend more on health.6 Figure 2 shows the
average government health expenditure share of GDP for countries at different income
levels in 2007. Low-income countries spent slightly over 2% of GDP on health, high-
income countries devoted more than 5% of their GDP to the sector.
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Figure 2. Government Health Spending Share of GDP by Income Classification, 2007
5 This paper focuses mainly on the literature on determinants on government health spending for low and
middle-income countries. For a review of the empirical evidence on the determinants in high income
countries read Gerdtham, U.G. And Jonsson, B. (2000),“International comparisons of health expenditures:
Theory, Data, and Econometric analysis”, in A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse (Eds.), Handbook of health
economics, Vol. 1A, Elsevier, Amsterdam; Sanz I, Velázquez, F. J (2002) “Determinants of the
Composition of Government Expenditure by Functions” Working Paper no. 13/2002, The European
Economy Group; And most recent: Shelton, C. A. (2007). "The size and composition of government
expenditure." Journal of Public Economics 91(11-12): 2230-2260.
6 ADB (2006), Key Indicators: Measuring Policy Effectiveness in Health and Education, Manila: Asian
Development Bank.
5Among low-income countries there is a wide variation in government health spending.
Figure 3 shows health’s portion of the budget in low-income countries in 2007 that
ranging from 1.1% in Pakistan to over 27.7% in Rwanda.7 Lower revenue-generating
capabilities of governments in low-income countries could be reason government health
expenditure, as a share of the overall budget, tends to be low. This fact does not explain
why the share of government spending on health is lower in low-income countries. From
a cross-section perspective, the rising share of health in the government budget is crude
evidence of a health-specific version of Wagner’s Law. Wagner – a 19th century German
political economist – argued that there was a tendency for the size of the government, as a
share of the economy, to grow as economic growth takes place. Wagner postulated
several explanations for this theory.8
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Figure 3. Share of Health in Government Budget in Low-Income Countries, 2007
There are several reasons that could explain why government’s health spending tends to
increase with income. One simple explanation, as pointed out by Herrera and Pang (2004)
is change in relative prices as GDP expands.9 10 Health provision is a relatively labor-
7 These numbers are WHO estimates and may not correspond exactly to numbers from country estimates.
8 Peacock, A. and A Scott (2000), “The Curious Attraction of Wagner’s Law,” Public Choice, 102: 1-17.
9 Herrera, S. and G. Pang (2004), “Efficiency of Public Spending in Developing Countries: An Efficiency
Frontier Approach,” Policy Research Working Paper No. 3645, Washington, DC: World Bank.
6intensive activity and, because wages relative to other prices increase with growth, the
same level of health service provision becomes more expensive to provide in richer
countries. This change in relative prices could result in a rise of health’s share of the
government budget even if the aggregate amount of health output produced by the
government remains unchanged.
A second explanation is that the revenue-collecting capacities of governments increase
with income, creating fiscal space for increasing government expenditures. A third
explanation for the rise in health’s share of the government budget is a possible change in
societal preferences. Citizens are more likely to demand and expect more and better
health and social services from the government as their income rises. Wealthier countries
tend to have larger elderly populations with more non-communicable diseases and a
greater need for chronic care. This situation increases demand for services, and therefore
increases health spending.11 In addition to income, allocations towards health are not only
determined by the total amount of resources available in the economy, but by domestic,
international politics, public allocation decision, and several other relevant determinants
of government health spending.
Level of democracy: Do governments in democratic countries spend proportionally more
on health? The median voter hypothesis predicts that in low-income democratic countries,
(where the median voter is likely to be poor) governments should place a greater
emphasis on spending for sectors such as health.12 This hypothesis has been confirmed,
but also rejected by the literature. Baqir (2002) finds significant impact on democracy on
social spending13. Keefer, P. and S. Khemani (2005) find it does not hold for low-income-
10 There is speculation as to the reasons why, in general, “government activity” rises with income. Possible
explanations include the fact that demand for government provision of services such as transport and
communications rises with industrialization, as does the need for social welfare due to growing urbanization
and population conglomeration.
11 ADB (2006), Key Indicators: Measuring Policy Effectiveness in Health and Education, Manila: Asian
Development Bank.
12 Meltzer, A. and S. Richard. 1981. “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” Journal of Political
Economy, 89(5): 914–927.
13 Baqir, R. 2002. “Social Sector Spending in a Panel of Countries.” IMF Working Paper No. WP/02/35.
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
7countries.14 On average, it appears that more democratic countries do spend more on
health.15 A point of interest is for health outcomes, many countries that have performed
well in terms of health outcomes are not democracies (e.g., Cuba, China, and Vietnam).
And many democracies (such as India) have performed extremely poorly on health.
Trade openness: Shelton (2007) has an eminent review of the different hypothesis in the
literature on this topic. The prominent one is Rodrik's hypothesis (1998), which state
countries with open economies tend to have larger governments. Open economies can
increase countries exposure to risk, leading to rising social and welfare spending (not
health spending specifically). Shelton’s results explain how developed and developing
countries can be viewed differently in terms of how the total expenditure associated with
larger trade openness is looked upon. While in developed countries the increase is
concentrated in social security. In developing countries, greater openness is associated
with spending on transportation infrastructure and education. However, Shelton concludes
it is a topic where more research is needed for a reliable conclusion.
Ethnic fractionalization:16 Ethnic fractionalization is another determinant to understand
government resources allocated to health. Using cross-country data, Kuijs (2000) found
evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a negative effect on spending as well as the
efficiency of government health spending.17 McCarty (1993) found no evidence that
demographic diversity would impact public expenditure. Rather than decrease spending,
McCarty suggested it would encourage decentralization.18 Shelton (2007) uncovered
evidence that preference heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright
decreases in government expenditures (also a new explanation for Wagner’s Law). Lower
spending by the central government is significantly offset by higher spending from the
14 Keefer, P. and S. Khemani. 2005. “Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding
Political Incentives for Providing Public Services.” World Bank Research Observer, 20(1): 1–27.
15 Ross, M (2006), “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” American Journal of Political Science 50(4):860–
74.
16 Ethnic fractionalization is measured as the likely hood that any two randomly drawn individuals from a
population will be from different ethnic groups.
17 Kuijs, L. 2000. “The Impact of Ethnic Heterogeneity on the Quantity and Quality of Public Spending.”
IMF Working Paper No. WP/00/49. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund
18 McCarty, T.A. 1993. “Demographic Diversity and the Size of the Public Sector.” Kyklos, 46(2): 225–
240.
8local governments.19 The correlation between ethnic diversity and spending might not be
an exact according to Jackson (2009), who argues that the problem lies with the quality of
spending, and not the quantity. “Thus if the public good is associated with high spillovers
between groups then a negative effect of ethnic diversity will be caused by a reduction in
the quantity of spending with no expected effect on the quality of spending. Conversely,
low spillovers between groups would indicate the problem lies with the quality of
spending”.20 Liebermann (2007)21 supports the claim that government health spending
decreases as ethnic fractionalization increases. He analyzes the effects of ethnic
fractionalization on government AIDS policies and found that increased ethnic
fractionalization affects AIDS policies, even after controlling for income per capita. The
method he used to test this theory is interesting and unorthodox. Instead of using actual
HIV/AIDS spending data, he reviewed country’s budget speeches and the amount HIV
and AIDS commitments that were mentioned. This is not an optimal indicator for the
reason it will only be a “soft commitment” compared to actual spending data. Mentioning
HIV/AIDS in a speech does not transfer into actual spending, but Liebermann argues
strongly that the budget speech data provides confirmation on actual expenditure. He
assumes policy making is driven by the perceived (un)popularity of different policies,
expecting that aggressive governments will act more boldly than passive ones who will
say little regarding HIV/AIDS spending. Using data from e.g. National Health Accounts
on HIV spending compared to budget speech data, Liebermann would have a stronger
case.
Corruption: The amount of corruption has been suggested as a determinant of government
health spending in low and middle-income countries. The literature provides empirical
evidence that corruption plays a part in lowering social expenditure in terms of
government health and education spending. These studies control for relevant indicators
19 Shelton, C. A. (2007). "The size and composition of government expenditure." Journal of Public
Economics 91(11-12): 2230-2260.
20 Jackson, K (2009), “Culture and Government An Analysis of the Interaction Between Formal and
Informal Institutions”, a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor
of philosophy in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Economics). The University of British Colombia
(Vancouver) link: http://www.kjackson.net/research/files/kenthesis.pdf
21 Lieberman, E. S (2007), “Ethnic politics, risk, and policy-making - A cross-national statistical analysis of
government responses to HIV/AIDS”. Comparative Political Studies 40(12);1407-1432.
9such as income, and size of government.22 23 24 25 One reason why corruption effects the
reduction of government health spending could be that health projects require large sums
of money. Corrupt governments may be seeing the possibilities for larger kickbacks.26 If
health projects were to potentially bring larger kickbacks for corrupt governments, it’s
been found the result is a decrease and not increases in spending. We can question the
accuracy of this particular type of data because it involves countries reporting their own
shortcomings.
Additional factors found in the literature include: i) historical, relating in part to colonial
experiences and institutional inheritances; ii) Institutional factors, affecting social security
spending (Hicks and Swank, 1992 and Alesina, 1999). As in India where regional health
expenditure is determined not only by iii) real state per capita income, but also by iv)
literacy rate27; v) engagement by civil society organizations; vi) the level of
decentralization28.
This section reviewed the cross-country literature with respect to determinants for
government health spending. The next section reviews the literature on gender and health
spending.
22 Mauro, P. 1997. "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure: A
Cross-Country Analysis'.” In Corruption and the World Economy, edited by K.A. Elliot. Washington, DC:
Institute for International Economics
23 Mauro, P. (1998). "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure." Journal of Public
Economics 69(2): 263-279.
24 Delavallade, C. (2006). "Corruption and distribution of public spending in developing countries." Journal
of Economics and Finance 30(2): 222-239.
25 Ghobarah, H, Huth, P and Russett, B (2004), “Comparative Public Health: The Political Economy of
Human Misery and Well-Being” International Studies Quarterly (2004) 48, 73–94.
26 ADB (2006), Key Indicators: Measuring Policy Effectiveness in Health and Education, Manila: Asian
Development Bank.
27 Rahman, T (2008), “Determinants of public health expenditure: some evidence from Indian states”,
Applied Economics Letters 15(11);853-857.
28 Mosca, I (2007) “Decentralization as a determinant of health care expenditure: empirical analysis for
OECD countries,” Applied Economics Letters, 14(7-9);511-515
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3 GENDER’S RELATIONSHIP TO ALLOCATIONS
FOR HEALTH: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Do women make a difference in prioritization of health, or do women make the same
choices as men? Becker (1991) found that both men and women make decisions with a
priority on maximizing household income. However to suppose such a harmonious
relationship within a household, a village council or in parliament; assuming that women
and men have the same preferences is by far a rough assumption. To exemplify this we
can look at the relationship between women’s suffrage and social spending in Western
Europe. Time series data tells us that social spending increased by 0.6 – 1.2 percent in the
short term, and three to eight times higher long term, is consequential of women’s
suffrage.29 Abraham (1999)30 comes to similar results.
There is little to no research regarding gender as a determinant for macro level
government health spending. Hence the next sections review the literature from household
and sub-national/individual country level. When women make decisions, is spending on
health prioritized more so than if men were to decide?
3.1 Women as Decision Makers Within the Household
There is evidence that indicates households cannot be treated as a single entity decision
maker. This is due to relative income from each family effecting spending priority. Duflo
(2005)31 has tested whether income in the hands of women has a different impact on intra-
household allocation compared to men. Referring to studies where the evidence suggest
assets in the hands of women is associated with larger improvements in child health
(Thomas, 1990), larger expenditure shares of household nutrients, health, and housing
29 Aidt, T. S. and B. Dallal (2008). "Female voting power: the contribution of women's suffrage to the
growth of social spending in Western Europe (1869-1960)." Public Choice 134(3-4): 391-417.
30 Abrams, B. A. and R. F. Settle (1999). "Women's suffrage and the growth of the welfare state." Public
Choice 100(3-4): 289-300.
31 Duflo, E (2005), “Gender Equality in Development”, Bureau for Research in Economic Analysis of
Development, Policy Paper No. 011 Link: http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/policy/p011.pdf
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(Thomas 1992), and children are in better health if their mother brought more resources
into the marriage (Thomas, Frankenberg, and Contreras (2002)).32 A recent paper by
Bobonis (2009) using data from the Mexican PROGRESA program on women’s income
program supports the theory with data. Female-specific income changes have a
substantial effect on children’s goods expenditure shares.33
Duflo and Udry (2004) explored gender differences in household spending in a study
based in Côte d’Ivoire. It was found that men and women grow different crops; therefore
the same rainfall has a different effect based on who makes agricultural decisions. The
effects of this change consumption within the family in years when the production of
women’s crops is higher, the household spends a bigger share of its budget on food and
private goods for women. In years when the production of male’s crops is higher, the
household spends a bigger share of the budget on alcohol and tobacco and male private
goods. Duflo suggest the identity of the income recipient has an impact on its allocation.
Duflo (2003)34 strengthened these views by exploring the effects of children’s health with
their respective grandparents and who are recipients of the Old Age Pension Program.
Duflo found that girls who live with a grandmother who receives a pension have a higher
body weight than those who live with a grandmother who is not quite old enough to
receive the pension. In contrast, no such effect was found when a grandfather receives the
pension, and no corresponding effects were found for boys.
Himanshu (2006)35 elucidated gender inequalities in household’s health expenditure in
urban Orissa, finding that out of pocket (OOP) expenditure differs significantly between
males and females, with males spending more than females. The author points out that
while the female OOP is higher in urban compared to rural and tribal Orissa, in all of the
32 Thomas, Duncan, Frankenburg, Elizabeth, and Dante Contreras (2002), “Distribution of Power within the
Household and Child Health,” Mimeo, UCLA
33 Bobonis, J. G. (2009). "Is the Allocation of Resources within the Household Efficient? New Evidence
from a Randomized Experiment." Journal of Political Economy 117(3): 453-503.
34 Duflo, Esther (2003), “Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old Age Pension and Intra-Household
Allocation in South Africa,” World Bank Economic Review 17(1), 2003, pp. 1-25.
35Himanshu Sekhar, Rout (2006): “Gender inequality in household health expenditure: the case of urban
Orissa” Published in: Nagarlok 3 XXXVIII (2006): pp. 44-48.
Link: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6544/1/MPRA_paper_6544.pdf
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areas the male has a stronger influence on OOP. This suggests that people living in urban
Orissa have higher income, more education, and show consciousness towards gender.
They have an intrinsic value of good health, and therefore might have the willingness and
ability to pay for more and higher quality health care.
Female preferences do not necessary favor a healthier lifestyle and healthcare. Edmonds
(2006)36 uses Duflo’s (2003) Old Age Pension Reform to study the impact of pension
programs on education. The findings suggest that children are more likely to be in school
when they live with an eligible man than with an eligible woman. It is uncertain if this is
because of women’s willingness, or ability to have, and transport children to school.
Prioritizing education is not enough for the female population in this case, and men
become the more beneficial gender for children’s education.
When women are empowered, research has shown that child health as well as public
health improves. Power is important on a household level. How would this effect a larger
scale, like a village council? The next section examines the literature “one step up”; at the
sub national level, where women can have an impact on broader policy decision.
3.2 Women as Decision Makers Within The Village
Councils/Sub-National Level
To measure and understand the effects of women as policy makers on health related
issues can be difficult for several reasons. Duflo (2005)37 has focused on this idea. The
result found at household level was that females are more concerned about child health,
with a priority set on improving a child’s health. Another reason builds on this idea, that
women will prioritize policies that affect their own set of priorities (health). A potential
stringent assumption since in order to be re-elected, politicians need to some extent do
what their constituents expect.
36 Edmonds, Eric (2006), ““Child labor and schooling responses to anticipated income in South Africa”,
Journal of Development Economics Volume 81, Issue 2, December 2006, Pages 386-414
37 Duflo, E (2005), “Gender Equality in Development”, Bureau for Research in Economic Analysis of
Development, Policy Paper No. 011 Link: http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/policy/p011.pdf
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Trying to understand the effects of women as policy makers, Chattopadhyay and Duflo
(2004) 38 studied the states of West Bengal and Rajasthan, India after 1992, where one of
the requirements was that a third of all council seats and council presidencies were
reserved for women. Both researchers theorized that gender play a role in political
priority. As an example, they hypothesized that women prefer social investments to those
related to transport infrastructure. .
Building on Chattopadhyay and Duflo’s findings, Duflo (2005)39 began to focus on
quantity and quality of public goods in India. She found that when the Panchayat 40
(Village level administration of public goods in India) is reserved for women, there are
significantly more public water sources available, and those water sources are better
maintained. In this situation, she found that the population became less satisfied if their
leader was a woman than a man. Duflo argued that this could be a cultural barrier,
recognizing women as competent policymakers, and hence possibly explaining why there
are so few-elected woman at the local level in India. The same study also found that
women take significantly fewer bribes than their male counterpart. Vijayalakshmi
(2008)41 found contradicting evidence to Chattopadhaya and Duflo. In a study focused on
India, he found no correlation between gender and corruption in government.
Beaman et al. (2008) explored a random variation in mandated exposure of female leaders
across village councils in the Indian state of West Bengal, and found that if the chief
councilor of the Panchayat was female, they provided more public goods of equal quality
at a lower price, they implemented more pro-women policies, and took less bribes than
38 Chattopadhyay, R and E Duflo (2004), “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy
Experiment in India,” Econometrica, 72(5): 1409-1443.
39 Duflo, E (2005), “Why Political Reservations”? Journal of the European Economic Association 3(2–
3):668–678 Link; http://povertyactionlab.org/papers/67_Duflo_Why_Political_Reservations.pdf
40 The Panchayat is a system of village-level (Gram Panchayat), block-level (Panchayat Samiti), and
district-level (Zilla Parishad) councils, whose members are elected by the people that are responsible for the
administration of local public goods. Each Gram Panchayat (GP) encompasses between 1,000 and 10,000
individuals in a group of villages (between 1 and 15). The GPs do not have jurisdiction over urban areas,
which are administered by separate municipalities.
41 Vijayalakshmi, V. (2008). "Rent-Seeking and Gender in Local Governance." Journal of Development
Studies 44(9): 1262-1288.
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their male counterparts.42 Four year earlier, Duflo and Topalova (2004) found the same
results for the Indian State of Bangalore.43
High-income countries, such as Sweden, have also been studied in regards to gender and
policy actions. A study by women in local councils of Sweden found that increased
representation of women in the local council increased spending on childcare and
education proportionately to elderly care (Svaleryd, 2009).44 Halse (2009) finds similar
support from Norwegian, that local councils with a higher degree of women spend more
on public childcare.45
Two relatively new studies challenged and built on the preceding results found in the
literature. Bardhan et al (2009)46 who examined the impact of political reservations for
women and scheduled castes and tribes (SC/ST)47 candidates in local government in West
Bengal, India (some of the same geographical area Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)
studied impacts). He covered a wider geographical area and time period; 1998 – 2004. He
also used extensive self-reported household data. Self reported household data is able to
measure the distribution of benefits provided by the local government. The evidence
showed no positive impact of women reservation in Gram Panchayat on any targeted
measure. This was a significant negative effect on some dimensions of targeting public
goods to the SC/ST groups.
42 Lori Beaman, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande and Petia Topalova (2008)
“Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?” NBER Working Paper No. 14198 Issued in July 2008
http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/3122
43 Esther Duflo and Petia Topalova (2004), “Unappreciated Service: Performance, Perceptions, and Women
Leaders in India” Link: http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/793
44 Svaleryd, H. (2009). "Women's representation and public spending." European Journal of Political
Economy 25(2): 186-198.
45 Halse, A (2009), “A woman’s touch. The impact of gender on political priorities” master thesis, Centre of
Equality, Social Organization, and Performance (ESOP), University of Oslo. Link:
http://www.esop.uio.no/research/masterthesis/Halse.xml
46 Pranab Bardhan, Dilip Mookherjee, and Monica L. Parra Torrado (December 26, 2009), “Impact of
political reservations in West Bengal local governments on anti poverty targeting”
47 SC/ST are Indian population groupings that are explicitly recognized by the Constitution of India,
previously called the "depressed classes".
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Taking a second look at household data, Dongrey (2010)48 researched whether gender had
any implication for child health by examining the relationship between prevalence of
water borne diseases and gender. He looked at the head of the 593 district village council
in India. If the female was head of council, it did not affect the prevalence of water born
diseases. However, looking at sub-categories, he found that females from upper castes
managed to reduce the prevalence of water born diseases. Villages with female council
heads from the CT/ST showed no effect. He also found that upper caste females tend to
obtain drinking water from a safe source. This could simply be because upper caste
females could have easier access to water compared to lower caste females.
Who makes the best decisions for a community at the sub-national level, women or men?
Lindgren et al. (2009)49 studied the political representation in 24 Indian Villages. The
findings support that equal representation of women increases the opinion congruence
between elites and masses.
Given that most of the studies found in the literature focus on India, extrapolating
evidence from one society to another requires extreme caution. However it leads us to
believe that the role of women with respect to investing in health could be a relevant
factor at the micro level. Could this imply that gender parity is a relevant factor at the
macro level as well? The next section will explore this literature.
3.3 Women as Decision Makers at The Macro Level
In a cross section study of countries, Dollar et al. (2001) found that higher rates of female
participation in governments was associated with lower levels of corruption; partly
implying that women are less willing to sacrifice the common good for personal gain than
48 Ambrish Dongrey (This Version: January 8, 2010), “Female Political Leadership and the Prevalence of
Water Borne Diseases: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in India”
49 Lindgren, K. O., M. Inkinen, et al. (2009). "Who Knows Best What the People Want: Women or Men? A
Study of Political Representation in India." Comparative Political Studies 42(1): 31-55.
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their male counterparts.50 While the result of this study doesn’t relate to government
health spending directly, some may consider the two vaguely linked. As previously
discussed, the level of corruption in a country plays a role on government health
spending. If female participation in government can reduce corruption, it may be
government health spending would be positively affected.
A study that explored government prioritization of health at a macro level was Ghobarah
et al. (1999)51. The authors approach state leaders, providing six hypotheses asking their
reactions to them.52 The hypothesis where related to the willingness to increase
allocations towards government health spending. The study found empirical evidence that
supported high level of democracy, education, and per capita income to stand out as
economic and social factors the state leaders, in response to terms of increasing
government health spending. Dictatorship, severe income inequality, ethnic heterogeneity,
and persistent international hostilities decrease government spending on health. A similar
finding was supported by Ross (2006) for middle and higher income countries. Given
most state leaders are men (for 2007, 193 men worldwide, 23 women); relating the
findings as indicators is too vague. At best it would be an indicator male state leaders
would respond to. So how can women’s impact on government health spending
potentially be measured? By exploring women’s participation in politics!
Portion of seats held by women in national parliaments differs significantly around the
world. In 2007, high-income countries had a higher participation rate compared to low-
income countries (Figure 4). While discrimination in social institutions is well known to
be one of the causes for this, some countries have now implemented policies to empower
50 Dollar, D., Fisman R., Gatti R. (199) “Are Women Really the “Fairer” Sex? Corruption and Women in
Government”, Policy research report on gender and development, Working Paper Series, No. 4. The World
Bank Development Research Group/Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network
Link: http://sec.sec.lt/pages/alfdiskusijos/pages/discuss3/docs/gender%20and%20corruption.pdf
51 Ghobarah, H, Huth, P and Russett, B (2004), “Comparative Public Health: The Political Economy of
Human Misery and Well-Being” International Studies Quarterly (2004) 48, 73–94.
52 The hypotheses are: (1) high level of democracy; (2) income inequality; (3) racial/linguistic/religious
diversity; (4) international rivalry; (5) education; and (6) per capita income.
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women. Increasing women in parliament is one of the Millennium Development Goal53
indicators (MDG 3) – to promote gender equity and empower women.
SOURCE: THE WORLD BANK
Figure 4. Proportion of Seats Held in National Parliament by Women (%), 2007
Can the findings from intra-household and the sub-national level imply that gender parity
within government is important for allocations towards health at the macro level? Using
macro level data the next section will explore this. Are countries where gender parity
within governments, (measured here as the percentage of women in national parliament)
be more pronounced, and more likely to invest in health, controlling for other possible
determinants?
53 In 2000, 189 countries committed to attain improvements in human development by 2015, identifying key
objectives called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). To reach these goals, rich and poor nations
agreed to work side by side to make significant changes in such areas as health improvements, empowering
females, and using resources wisely. The eight goals are: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve
universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality;
improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental
sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development.
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: FEMALE
REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENTS AND
GOVERNMENT HEALTH SPENDING
4.1 Cross-Country Approaches
This section will discuss countries with higher proportion of women in the parliament and
its effect on health compared to countries with a low female representation in parliament.
Parliamentary institutions are important to the politics of states because parliaments make
laws and develop public norms. They also legitimize political systems. They are the
representative body for their respective country, and are the space for decision-making.54
Parliaments approve the health budget, and are a relevant arena to study the significance
of female representation.
If the views shown from the previous section from the micro level hold, one would
anticipate at the macro level, government health spending would be positively correlated
to female representation in parliament. This relationship is shown in Figure 5. Using a
three-year average from 2006 to 2008 the graph indicates if anything the higher
percentage of women in national parliaments, the higher government health spending as
share of GDP is.
54 Professor Shirin Rai, Department of Politics & International Studies,
Link: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/warwickbooks/complexity/shirin_rai/
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Figure 5. Proportion of Seats Held in National Parliament by Women (%) vs.
Government Spending on Health as Proportion of GDP (average 2006 – 2008)
While there seems to be a relationship between the portion of women in parliament and
government health spending, this graph may be incorporating other factors like; countries
income, level of corruption, democracy, trade openness, and ethnolinguistic
fractionalization. By controlling for these determinants with an econometric model the
relationship of political representation of women on government health spending can
better be singled out.
To investigate this relationship, the next section describes the data that will be used in the
two econometric models described in section 4.3. Section 5 will review the results.
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4.2 Data
Several sources of data where used for this study. This includes data from officially
recognized international sources such as the World Bank, World Health Organization,
United Nations, Transparency International, Penn World Table, The Center for Systemic
Peace, and Desmet et al. Data was downloaded and collected from different sources and
merged into one dataset55 using World Bank country codes as the unique identifier. The
indicators:
1. World Health Organization (WHO), National Health Accounts offers data on
government spending on health as proportion of GDP (GHEGDP) which includes
public health expenditure consisting of recurrent and capital spending from government
(central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from
international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory)
health insurance funds. This is the dependent variable.
2. United Nation database provides access to the main indicator Women in parliaments.
That is defined as the percentage of parliamentary seats in a single or lower chamber held
by women. Source: United Nations, Women's Indicators and Statistics database
(www.ipu.org). Downloaded, Oct 6.2010.
3. The World Bank International Comparison Program database provide the GDP per
capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) (constant 2005 international $). PPP
GDP per capita is gross domestic product converted into international dollars using
purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power
over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum
of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without
55 The empirical work and generating of figures, the statistical program STATA 11 version 1 for MAC was
used.
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making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation
of natural resources.
4. Transparency International offers the index: Corruption Perceptions Index, a score
that measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption. The score goes from 1, the
most to 10, the least corrupt. The CPI is not intended to measure a country's progress over
time but rather be a snapshot of perceptions of corruption, using data published in the past
two years. The CPI is a survey of surveys, of experts and businesspeople, based both
within a country and abroad.
5. The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) with their Polity IV Project put forward the
indicator for country’s level of democracy. The polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly
democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The revised combined polity score indicator;
polity2 is used since it’s facilitates time series analyses.
6. Penn World Table56 provides data on countries Openness, and is the total trade as a
percentage of GDP (constant price).
7. ELF index: a data set from Desmet et al. (2009)57 to measure ethnolinguistic
fractionalization; the probability that two randomly picked individuals belongs to
different groups. The variable has only 202 observations, and is collected in this dataset in
one year. However each data point refers to a different year for each country, ranging
from 1979 – 2001. But given ELF change very little over time, i.e. ELF can be the same
and valid for about 50 years or so, the variable is still part as an explanatory variable in
this cross-country analysis.
56 PWT 6.3 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, August
2009
57 Desmet, K., Ortuño-Ortin, I. and Wacziarg, R. (2009), “The Political Economy of Ethnolinguistic
Cleavages,” NBER Working Paper #15360, September 2009
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Table 1 provides summary statistics of the above variables in the dataset used in Model
(1).
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables, Average 2006 – 2008
Variables N mean sd min max
Year 185 2007 0.8 2006 2008
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP), All countries 185 3.9 2.4 0.7 13.8
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP), Low and middle-
income
137 3.4 2.3 0.7 13.8
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP), High income countries 48 5.3 2.1 1.1 8.7
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%),
All countries
185 16.3 10.1 0.0 51.3
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%),
Low and middle
137 15 9.3 0.0 51.3
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%),
High income
48 20 11 0 47
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) in
thousands
172 11.5 12.9 .3 71.5
Corruption Perceptions Index: (1, most to 10, least corrupt) 174 4.0 2.1 1.6 9.4
Level of democracy: +10, strongly democratic to -10, strongly
autocratic
155 3.8 6.3 -10 10
Openness: Total trade as a percentage of GDP, (constant prices) 179 99.6 51 25.2 450
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Probability two randomly
picked individuals belong to different groups
183 0.16 0.18 0.0 0.6
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International, Penn World
Table, The Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.
Table 1. Summary statistics of variables in the cross country dataset, Average 2006 – 2008
Missing data is a problem in this type of analysis. Although ethnolinguistic
fractionalization has few numbers of observations the data points collide in a
complimentary way with other indicators, and therefore did not drop many countries from
the analysis. The democracy data did not fit well with the other datasets, and was the
variable that dropped the most countries from the analysis.
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To investigate further the effects on government health spending with the mentioned
indicators in a cross-country, and within country analysis, a simple econometrical analysis
was used. The next chapter brings forward the two econometric models.
4.3 A Model of The Effects of Female Representation in
Parliaments on Government Health Spending
To investigate the relationship between gender and government health spending between
countries, the following model is specified:
(1)
The equation to be estimated is given by (1) where Yi represents government health
expenditure in country i. Because all countries are observed in the same time period;
average, 2006-2008, notation of t is excluded from the model.  is a constant term,
parliament refers to the variable proportion of seats held by women in national
parliaments, and is the explanatory variable with coefficient – or marginal effect  . X i is
a set of control variables and refers to GDP per capita, corruption, level of democracy,
trade openness and ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  i is their coefficient vector, and  i
is the error term.
Cross-country correlations may be vulnerable to unobserved country differences affecting
both health spending and gender representation. As a test for robustness, the analysis is
extended with a within country model with fixed country effects. In such a model, the
effect of gender representation on health spending is indentified as variation in gender
representation within the country over time. Such a model will also have its limitations as
the within-country variation in female parliamentary representation is limited, and
typically changes only when elections are held.
The regressors remain consistent with the exception of ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
trade openness, and level of democracy, which have been dropped as they change little
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within the selected timeframe. Their eventual importance is thus unidentified when
country fixed effects are introduced. The estimated equation is given by (2).
(2)
All the variables are described in detail in sections 4.2 and discussed in the literature
review in section two. Results from Model (1) are displayed in Table 2 – 4; Model (2),
Table 6 – 8.
5. RESULTS: RELATING GENDER TO
GOVERNMENT HEALTH SPENDING
5.1 Cross-Country Analysis
In a cross section analysis where one associates the presence of women in parliament with
government health spending, the theoretically best comparison would be if yearly data
were present for all variables in all countries. The reason for this is that budgets are
decided on an early basis with the female participation in that given year. Controlling for
several determinants that might not get tracked each year (and therefore have missing
values), we will use an average from 2006 – 2008 for all variables. This will allow us to
increase the amount of observations in the analysis. There are downsides to using such an
average. If a country were to have a large share of women in parliament two years ago;
this would not be relevant if the share is small this year. Such a result might indicate that
the variable is picking up other factors than female representation in parliament, e.g.
countries level of development. There are several analytic techniques that can be used to
fill in missing data in time series. One example is what Institute for Health Metrics and
Evaluation (IHME) developed. A technique that can fill in missing data, the program is
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called Déjà vu.58 However, it is outside the scope of this paper to use this type of
techniques.
Table 2 to 4 present the results from the cross-country regressions using Model (1). In all
tables the dependent variable is government spending on health, measured as proportion
of GDP (GHEGDP). Table 2 shows results for all countries, Table 3 for low and middle-
income countries, and Table 4 for high-income countries (see Annex 1 for detailed
information about countries, their income classifications, regions, and the three year
average for GHEGPD and women in parliament for each country). Countries are divided
by income classification because relationships from high-income countries factor
differently than for low and middle-income countries.
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments is measured in percentage
(from 0 to 100), and therefore the coefficient should be interpreted as the change in the
dependent variable (GHEGDP) if the proportion of women in parliaments changes with 1
percentage point.
The tables report results of several simple regression models on variables that in the
literature have shown to effect government health spending. What is new is it examines
whether the link between Government health spending as share of GDP, and proportion of
women in parliaments is robust to inclusion of the other determinants found to effect
health spending in the literature. Selection criteria for the rank of indicators put into the
model (from Column I to VI) was based on dropping the smallest amount of countries that
is feasible for each regression, and has no connection with important of indicators.
Models I to VI differ in terms of the independent variables used. Column I in each of the
three tables show the results when proportion of females is the sole independent variable.
The coefficient is positive and significant for all, and high-income countries (Table 2 and
58 Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) Link:
http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/what/areas/tools/models.html#one
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4), indicating that the portion of females in parliament has a positive influence on
government health spending.
But does this result just pick up that countries that are richer have higher government
health spending, and that women are better represented in these countries – because of
countries wealth? Assumed health is a normal good; as a country becomes wealthier,
demand for the good (in this case, health) increases. Introducing GDP per capita as an
explanatory variable can test for this.
Column II shows the models with both women in national parliaments and GDP per
capita. After controlling for GDP per capita, female representation is still positive and
significant for all, as well as high-income countries. For low and middle-income countries
the coefficient is not significant, it increased from 0.010 to 0.016. GDP per capita is
positive and significant for all countries (Table 2) indicating it has a positive influence on
government health spending. Another important factor to control for is heterogeneity
within countries. Empirical evidence has shown greater heterogeneity to be correlated
with lower levels of government investment in health.59 To measure the effect of
heterogeneity, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is used as a proxy for this in the next
regression.
Column III reports the regression that includes ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ES); as
measured by the probability of two randomly picked individuals belonging to different
groups, GDP per capita, and women representation. After controlling for these two
variables, female representation remains positive and significant for all, as well as for
high-income countries. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization is negative and significant for all,
high, and for low and middle-income countries. This confirms the findings of Kujis
(2000).60 It is interested that the effect in high-income countries is about three times that
of the negative effect compared to low and middle-income countries. Addison and
59 Ross, M (2006), “Is Democracy Good for the Poor?” American Journal of Political Science 50(4):860–
74.
60 Kuijs, L. 2000. “The Impact of Ethnic Heterogeneity on the Quantity and Quality of Public Spending.”
IMF Working Paper No. WP/00/49. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund
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Rahman (2001) found ethnolinguistic fractionalization to be an important factor for
inequality in public allocations. The more diverse a country, the more unequal education
expenditure became.61 Although the authors do not look at public health spending, a study
from Asian Development Bank shows spending in the health and education sectors are to
be highly correlated.62 While this might explain EF, it fails to say much about the waste
difference in the coefficient from low-and middle, to high-income countries. It remains
unanswered at this point in this paper. The next regression will show the influence of
trade openness.
Column IV examines trade openness, measured as total trade as a percentage of GDP,
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, GDP per capita and women participation in parliaments.
The coefficient on women in parliament remains positive, and significant for all, and
high-income countries. While openness is significant for low and middle, and high-
income countries, the coefficient is positive for low income and negative for high-income
countries. Trade openness seems to increase government health spending for low and
middle-income countries, and reduce it for high income ones. This is an interesting,
contradictory result compared to what Shelton (2007) finds. Shelton found that the
relationship between trade openness and government spending in high-income countries
is concentrated in social security spending. That it will increase government health
spending. In low-income countries trade openness is associated with spending on
transportation, infrastructure, and education, unrelated to health. As mentioned
previously, education and health spending are highly correlated, and this may be what’s
being reflected in this instance.
Column V looks at corruption, measured as a perception index where as 1 is the most, to
10, the least corrupt, in addition to the other indicators controlled for in Column IV.
Although the coefficient for women participation is significant, it drops for all (0.032 to
0.024), and high-income countries (0.096 to 0.051). Interestingly, the same coefficient for
61 Addision T. and A. Rahman. (2001), “Why is so little spent on educating the poor” UNU WIDER
discussion paper no. 20001/29. Helsinki: United Nation University.
62 Asian Development Bank (2006), "Measuring Policy Effectiveness in Health and Education." The 37th
issue of the Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries. Regional Surveys & Strategies.
Link: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2006/pdf/Special-Chapter-2006.pdf
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low and middle-income countries is not significant, but increases from 0.05 to 0.019. This
could suggest women participation in parliament in low and middle-income countries are
more relevant for the relative increase in government health spending compared to high-
income countries. This would be after controlling for corruption. The effect of corruption
has been found to be marginal and not significant. To revisit the literature discussed in
section two, corruption seems to have a negative effect for all, high, and low-and middle-
income countries on government health spending. The last determinant from the literature
not controlled for yet is governance. The next section aims to find a firm answer
regarding women representation in parliament and its effect on government health
spending as share of GDP.
Column VI examines level of democracy measured from +10, strongly democratic to -10,
strongly autocratic, in addition to the indicators in Column V. This is the final cross-
country regression. It presents interesting results. It shows that female participation in
parliament is positive and significant for all, including low and middle-income countries.
It controls for all other factors. What it suggests is that women in parliament have a
relatively strong, independent impact on government health expenditure in countries with
these income classifications. Why is it that the effect of female participation becomes
significant only when controlling for level of democracy? One suggestion could be that
parliaments in democratic countries have more power and influence compared to
parliaments in autocratic countries. To have a large share of women in parliament in
countries that are less democratic will have little effect. It’s when parliaments have actual
power that women in the respective parliament can have impact with their set of
preferences. That is, to the degree women have a different set of “block” preferences.
Although this paper will not examine this statement, using an interaction term between
level of democracy and women participation one would be able to test this. After
controlling for the level of democracy, the coefficient for women participation for high-
income countries is now no longer significant. One reason for this could be non-linearity,
i.e. when countries has reached a certain level with respect to income, and female
representation, increasing the share of women in parliament will potentially not have a
large effect. The democracy indicator is positive and significant for all, low and middle,
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and high-income countries. Baqir (2003) found support for this as well; a significant
impact on democracy on social spending.63
This model used cross-section country-level data to assess the relationship between
women in parliament and government health spending as share of GDP for high, low, and
middle-income countries, controlling for the relevant determinants found in the literature.
The results indicate that women in parliament have a positive and significant effect,
although not a large one. Using the coefficient from Column VI, it suggest for each
percentage increase by women in parliament, government health spending as share of
GDP increases by 0.033 points for all countries, and by 0.035 points for low and middle-
income countries.
Are these results robust? This analysis suggests that women in parliament have a strong
impact on government health expenditure. A potential could be that number of
observations differs, and hence it may be wrong to compare results from one regression to
the other. A simple way to fix this is to do the regressions only for the 146, 110 and 36
countries in the Column VI that have observations for all the determinants. These tables
are found in Annex 3, and show by making the number of observations equally in all of
the regressions the coefficient increases in strength. Another issue is that it may be
omitted variables that explain female representation and changes in government health
spending. As a robustness test to Model (1), the next chapter uses a fixed effect model to
analyze the within country effects using data from 1997 – 2008. The purpose is to see if
this model will produce similar estimates and results as the cross-country analysis.
63 Baqir, R. 2002. “Social Sector Spending in a Panel of Countries.” IMF Working Paper No. WP/02/35.
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund
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Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), All Countries
I II III IV V VI
Proportion of seats held by women in
national parliaments (%)
0.061*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.032** 0.024* 0.033***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005
international $)
0.064*** 0.060*** 0.061*** -0.004 0.015
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization:
Probability two randomly picked
individuals belong to different groups
-2.89*** -3.56*** -3.1*** -2.51***
(0.829) (0.798) (0.688) (0.573)
Openness: Total trade as a percentage of
GDP (constant prices)
0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Corruption Perceptions Index: (1, most to
10, least corrupt)
0.553*** 0.383***
(0.105) (0.099)
Level of democracy: +10, strongly
democratic to -10, strongly autocratic
0.086***
(0.019)
_cons 2.931*** 2.335*** 2.875*** 2.883*** 1.396*** 1.414***
(0.324) (0.302) (0.337) (0.398) (0.414) (0.330)
Number of observations 185 172 170 168 164 146
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International, Penn World Table, The
Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al. (2009)
Table 2. Regression estimates of general government health expenditure as
share of GDP on women in parliament and other indicators for all countries, average 2006-2008
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Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), Low and Middle-Income Countries
I II III IV V VI
Proportion of seats held by women in national
parliaments (%)
0.010 0.016 0.014 0.005 0.019 0.035***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.012)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) 0.057 0.042 0.032 -0.011 0.017
(0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.030)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Probability two
randomly picked individuals belong to different groups
-1.81* -2.8*** -2.3*** -1.8***
(0.937) (0.834) (0.725) (0.591)
Openness: Total trade as a percentage of GDP
(constant prices)
0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Corruption Perceptions Index: (1, most to 10, least
corrupt)
0.402*** 0.346***
(0.143) (0.133)
Level of democracy: +10, strongly democratic to -10,
strongly autocratic
0.061***
(0.020)
_cons 3.274*** 2.726*** 3.110*** 2.062*** 0.716 0.606
(0.371) (0.386) (0.430) (0.501) (0.553) (0.458)
Number of observations 137 131 129 128 125 110
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International, Penn World Table, The Center for
Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.
Table 3. Regression estimates of general government health expenditure as share of GDP on
women in parliament and other indicators for low and middle-income countries,
average 2006-2008
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Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), High Income Countries
I II III IV V VI
Proportion of seats held by women in national
parliaments (%)
0.112*** 0.113*** 0.101*** 0.096*** 0.051** 0.028
(0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international
$)
-0.007 -0.001 0.012 -0.018 0.005
(0.027) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Probability two
randomly picked individuals belong to different
groups
-7.24*** -6.17*** -5.9*** -4.31***
(1.347) (1.409) (1.293) (1.191)
Openness: Total trade as a percentage of GDP
(constant prices)
-0.006** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Corruption Perceptions Index: (1, most to 10,
least corrupt)
0.425*** 0.269**
(0.147) (0.137)
Level of democracy: +10, strongly democratic to
-10, strongly autocratic
0.140***
(0.039)
_cons 3.104*** 3.399*** 4.330*** 4.591*** 3.582*** 3.126***
(0.502) (0.913) (0.715) (0.705) (0.772) (0.751)
Number of observations 48 41 41 40 39 36
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International, Penn World Table, The
Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.
Table 4. Regression estimates of general government health expenditure as share of GDP on
women in parliament and other indicators for high-income countries,
average 2006-2008
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5.2 Within-Country Analysis – A Robustness Test
To test whether unobserved country differences – not captured by the included covariates
– leads to spurious results this sections estimates a within country model. In such a model
the potential effect of gender is estimated purely on basis of the within country variation
in gender representation and health spending (due to the inclusion of a fixed country
effect). Data is taken from 1997 to 2008; 2007 being the earliest year available for the
variable of women in parliament. 2008 is the latest year available for government health
spending. By using a fixed effect model (equation 2) one can explore how the proportion
of females in parliament affects government health spending when variables have to
change over time within a country to be of relevance.
Table 5 describes the data used in this section, Model (2) does not control for
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, trade openness, or the level of democracy. The three
variables were dropped due to they change little within the selected timeframe, and
therefore not applicable indicators in this analysis.
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Variables, 1997 – 2008
Variables N mean sd min max
Year 2018 2002.7 3.5 1997 2008
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP), All countries 2018 3.7 2.2 0 16.7
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP), Low and middle-income 1476 3.2 2.0 0 16.7
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP), High income countries 542 5.3 1.9 0.9 10.3
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%), All countries 2018 13.5 9.6 0 56
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%), Low and middle 1476 11.9 8.5 0 56
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%), High income 542 17.9 11.1 0 47
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) in thousands 1882 10.4 11.9 0.3 72.8
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International, Penn World Table, The
Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.
Table 5. Summary statistics of variables in the within country dataset, 1997 – 2008
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Table 6 to 8 present the results for the within country fixed effect regressions. For all
tables the dependent variable is government spending on health, measured as proportion
of GDP (GHEGDP). Table 6 show results for all countries, Table 7 for low and middle-
income countries, and Table 8 for high-income countries. Proportion of seats held by
women in national parliaments is measured in percentage (from 0 to 100), and is therefore
the coefficient to be interpreted as the change in the dependent variable; government
health spending as share of GDP, if the proportion of women in parliaments changes with
1 percentage point.
As can be seen from Column I in all three tables, the results of proportion of seats held by
women in national parliaments as the sole independent variable. The coefficient is
positive and significant for all three tables indicating that the proportion of females in
parliament has a positive effect on government health spending over time.
Column II shows the models with both women in national parliaments, and the effect of
including a linear time trend. The coefficient on women in national parliament remains
significant, but for high-income countries the effect now becomes negative. It may be that
the effect, time (year) “steals the effect” from women in parliament. Does this mean the
women participation is not as relevant for government health spending in high-income
countries? It may indicate that trends in women in parliament and government health
expenditure is more strongly correlated for high-income countries than in low and middle-
income countries given the coefficient for the latter does not drop that much, 0.038 to
0.025. This result suggests that the effect of time does have an impact on government
health spending for all tables. Though, the effect might not need to be linear. Perhaps one
reaches a level where more women do not have an effect, and that many high-income
countries have already passed that limit.
Column III reports the models that include GDP per capita in addition to year, and women
in parliament. The latter is still is significant and positive, but not for high-income
countries. The effect of year is positive and significant for all models. We test for GDP
per capita to find out if richer countries have higher government health spending. The
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coefficient is significant for low and middle, and high-income countries, with a very small
negative number. This suggests effect of GDP per capita has an effect; however it’s a
small effect.
The effect of a linear time trend (“year”) is positive and significant for all the models
across all the tables. The time trend being positive indicates that countries use an
increasing fraction of their GDP on health. As the coefficient for female representation
falls when a time trend is included indicates that also female representation is increasing
over time and that its effect on health spending may be overestimated when such a time
trend is not included. Bringing in year (time trend) as an explanatory variable thus seems
to give better and potentially more accurate regressors. The next section compares the
estimates from Model (1) and (2). Are they comparable, and therefore indicate women in
parliament to be a robust relevant indicator to review for countries that explore how they
can increase government health spending?
Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), All Countries
I II III
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments 0.036*** 0.018*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Year 0.038*** 0.043***
(0.005) (0.006)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) -0.009
(0.010)
_cons 3.262*** -72.7*** -82.8***
(0.045) (9.509) (11.008)
Number of observations 2,018 2,018 1,882
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International,
Penn World Table, The Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.
Table 6. Fixed Effect Regression estimates of general government health expenditure as share of
GDP on women in parliament and other indicators for all countries, 1997-2008
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Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP),
Low and Middle-Income Countries
I II III
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments 0.038*** 0.025*** 0.019***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Year 0.030*** 0.043***
(0.006) (0.007)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) -0.08***
_cons 2.727*** -56.3*** -82.6***
(0.049) (11.648) (13.435)
Number of observations 1,476 1,476 1,416
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International,
Penn World Table, The Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.
Table 7. Fixed Effect Regression estimates of general government health expenditure as share of
GDP on women in parliament and other indicators for low and middle-income countries,
1997-2008
Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), High Income Countries
I II III
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments 0.028*** -0.012* -0.005
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Year 0.070*** 0.109***
(0.008) (0.012)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $) -0.04***
(0.011)
_cons 4.783*** -135.*** -211.***
(0.100) (15.141) (23.111)
Number of observations 542 542 466
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International,
Penn World Table, The Center for Systemic Peace,Desmet et al.
Table 8. Fixed Effect Regression estimates of general government health expenditure as share of
GDP on women in parliament and other indicators for high income countries, 1997-2008
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5.3 Comparing Cross-Country and Within Country Estimates
In Table 9 the results from the two models are compared. For each income classification,
the focus is on two of the estimates. The fixed effect from row (A), and the OLS estimate
from row (B). While the OLS estimate controls for all the determinants, the fixed effect
does not. However, the fixed effect model takes into account the mean (country)
differences in the independent variables because of the fixed effect. To include time-
varying covariates in addition to female representation there is a risk they will steal some
of the true effect, given they share common trends. But the flipside by not include these
covariates is the risk of female representation is given too much weight.
As can be seen from all columns, comparing the OLS to the fixed effect, the estimates are
corresponding, positive, and significant (with the exception of OLS in high income
countries). Suggesting robust results, which suggest if countries increase the share of
women in parliaments it will increase government health spending. The questions
becomes: By how much?
If countries classified as low and middle-income increased their share of women in
parliaments by 10 percentages points, government health spending as share of GDP would
on average increase somewhere between 10 and 12 percent. For high-income countries a
10 percentage point’s increase in female representation in parliament would on average
increase government health spending as share of GDP by 5 percent. For all countries, the
global estimate would on average imply between 8 to 10 percent increase in government
health spending as share of GDP, following a 10-percentage points increase in female
representation. The lower interval is the OLS coefficient (cross country estimate), and the
higher interval is the fixed effect coefficient (within country estimate). 64
64 Calculation: Coefficient (OLS or FE) divided by mean value of government health spending as share of
GDP for the respective income classification, multiplied with the suggested increase in women
participation: 10 percentage points.
38
Can these results be trusted? This study found a relationship, and the results are robust.
There is room for discussion regarding the precision of estimates and their real effect is.
Interpretation of results should always be done in a cautious manner. To begin with, this
paper does not answer whether gender is a determinant of government health spending. It
has shown to the relationship between gender and its effect on government health
spending. To verify gender as a determinant the next step could be to try finding a causal
relationship between them. An example of this would be to try determining gender as an
actual consequence that effected government health spending. This could be done by
studying the consequences of natural experiments in female political representation.
These would arise from reforms in electoral systems or relevant legislation. This is
however left to future research.
Second, there may be other aspects of female representation that could be studied, i.e. the
proportion of administrative and managerial positions held by women, the proportion of
local government positions held by women, and percentage of women in managerial
posts. There exist data for all of these indicators. Such complementary approaches could
enlighten this field even more. There are several reasons why this could give improve our
understanding of the effect of gender on government health spending. Countries that does
not have a high proportion of females in the parliament, but the women proportion
“downwards” in the system where bills/laws, regulation, etc are written/takes place could
have a impact, and could therefore indicate a interesting relationship. Female literacy
rates might be another factor to review. Rahman (2008) found literacy rates to be a key
determinant of public health expenditure in Indian states together with real state per capita
income65, however so far there is no support in the cross country literature on this topic.
Other factors of interest would be average years of schooling of female adults, and female
labor force participation.
65 Rahman, T (2008), “Determinants of public health expenditure: some evidence from Indian
states”, Applied Economics Letters 15(11);853-857.
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Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP)
OLS (I) FE (III) OLS (I) FE (III) OLS (I) FE (III)
Indicators ALL countries Low and middle-
income countries
High income
countries
(1) (2) (3)
Proportion of seats held by women
in national parliaments
0.061*** 0.036*** 0.01 0.038*** 0.112*** 0.028***
Standard Error (SE) (0.017) (0.003) (0.021) (0.004) (0.022) (0.005)(A)
Number of observations 185 2,018 137 1,476 48 542
Controlling for all determinants:
Proportion of seats held by women
in national parliaments
0.033*** 0.016*** 0.035*** 0.019*** 0.028 -0.005
Standard Error (SE) (0.011) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.021) (0.008)(B)
Number of observations 146 1,882 110 1,416 36 466
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OLS= Ordinary least squares; FE= Fixed effects model
Source: Collided data from tables 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8
Table 9. Comparing cross country and within country estimates
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the effect of gender on government health spending as share of
GDP. It finds that if the share of women in the parliaments of low- and middle-income
countries were to increase by 10 percentage points, government health spending would
increase, on average, by 10 to12 percent. For high-income countries, a similar increase in
female representation is predicted to increase government health spending by 5 percent.
The global estimate from the model predicts an 8 to 10 percent rise in health spending for
the same increase in female representation. One possible reason the effect is stronger in
low- and middle-income countries than in high-income countries is that, on average, high
income countries have a higher proportion of females in parliament. Whereas the average
percentage of female representatives between 1997 and 2008 in high-income countries
was 17.8, the percentage in low- and middle-income countries was only 11.9 (Table 5).
This could indicate that when a certain level of female representation is reached,
additional female representation might have a diminishing effect.
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Though broad, cross-country studies have significant value for understanding the
variation in state funding for health, they cannot account for the multitude of factors
beyond the immediate control of the public sector that contribute to differences in health
outcomes.66 Thus, a logical next step to build on this paper’s global and regional
perspective would be an examination of the effects of female representation on health
spending and health outcomes through case studies at the country level. This approach
would contribute significantly to the literature by revealing hidden determinants of health
outcomes and shedding light upon within country variation, including regional and socio-
demographic differences and gender inequalities.
66 ADB (2006), Key Indicators: Measuring Policy Effectiveness in Health and Education, Manila: Asian
Development Bank.
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APPENDIX 1. DETAILED INFORMATION ON
COUNTRIES REGION, INCOME CLASSIFICATION,
PUBLIC HEALTH SPENDING AS SHARE OF GDP, AND
PROPORTION OF SEATS HEALD BY WOMEN IN
NATIONAL PARLIAMENT (AVERAGE 2006 -2008)
This table classifies all countries in the dataset using World Bank country codes and
names. For operational and analytical purposes, economies are divided among income
groups according to 2008 gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the
World Bank Atlas method. Income classifications are from the World Bank Fiscal Year
2010, and were in effect until 1 July 2010.
The group’s income thresholds are:
LIC (lower Income country): $975 or less
LMC (lower middle) $976 - $3,855
UMC (Upper middle $3,856 - $11,905
HIC (High income) $11,906 or more
Regions are:
EAP: East Asia & Pacific
ECA: Europe & Central Asia
LAC: Latin America & the Caribbean
MENA: Middle East & North Africa
SAS: South Asia
SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa
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Detailed Information on Countries Region, Income Classification, Health Expenditure, Public (%
of GDP), and Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments (average 2006-2008)
World
Bank
Code World Bank Name
Income
Classification Region
Public
Health
Expenditure
(% of GDP)
Proportion
of Seats
Held by
Women in
National
Parliaments
AFG Afghanistan LIC SAS 1.8 27.3
ALB Albania LMC ECA 2.8 7.0
DZA Algeria UMC MNA 3.6 7.3
ADO Andorra HIC ECA 5.3 27.7
AGO Angola LMC SSA 2.2 22.3
ATG Antigua and Barbuda HIC LAC 3.4 11.0
ARG Argentina UMC LAC 4.9 37.5
ARM Armenia LMC ECA 1.9 7.3
AUS Australia HIC EAP 6.0 25.7
AUT Austria HIC ECA 7.7 32.0
AZE Azerbaijan LMC ECA 0.9 11.0
BHS Bahamas, The HIC LAC 3.6 14.7
BHR Bahrain HIC MNA 2.5 2.0
BGD Bangladesh LIC SAS 1.2 15.0
BRB Barbados HIC LAC 4.5 12.0
BLR Belarus UMC ECA 4.9 29.0
BEL Belgium HIC ECA 7.1 35.0
BLZ Belize LMC LAC 2.5 4.7
BEN Benin LIC SSA 2.5 8.7
BTN Bhutan LMC SAS 3.0 5.0
BOL Bolivia LMC LAC 3.4 17.0
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina UMC ECA 5.6 13.0
BWA Botswana UMC SSA 4.3 11.0
BRA Brazil UMC LAC 3.6 9.0
BGR Bulgaria UMC ECA 4.2 22.0
BFA Burkina Faso LIC SSA 3.4 14.0
BDI Burundi LIC SSA 5.3 31.0
KHM Cambodia LIC EAP 1.6 12.0
CMR Cameroon LMC SSA 1.3 12.3
CAN Canada HIC NAM 7.1 21.0
CPV Cape Verde LMC SSA 3.4 16.0
CAF Central African Rep. LIC SSA 1.6 11.0
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World
Bank
Code World Bank Name
Income
Classification Region
Public
Health
Expenditure
(% of GDP)
Proportion
of Seats
Held by
Women in
National
Parliaments
TCD Chad LIC SSA 2.7 6.3
CHL Chile UMC LAC 3.7 15.0
CHN China LMC EAP 1.9 20.3
COL Colombia UMC LAC 5.1 8.0
COM Comoros LIC SSA 1.9 3.0
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. LIC SSA 1.2 8.0
COG Congo, Rep. LMC SSA 1.5 7.7
CRI Costa Rica UMC LAC 5.8 38.3
CIV Cote d'Ivoire LMC SSA 1.0 9.0
HRV Croatia HIC ECA 6.4 21.0
CUB Cuba UMC LAC 9.5 38.3
CYP Cyprus HIC ECA 2.9 14.0
CZE Czech Republic HIC ECA 5.9 16.0
DNK Denmark HIC ECA 8.2 37.3
DJI Djibouti LMC MNA 5.6 12.0
DMA Dominica UMC LAC 3.8 15.0
DOM Dominican Republic UMC LAC 2.0 20.0
ECU Ecuador LMC LAC 2.3 25.0
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. LMC MNA 2.5 2.0
SLV El Salvador LMC LAC 3.7 17.0
GNQ Equatorial Guinea HIC SSA 1.5 14.0
ERI Eritrea LIC SSA 1.5 22.0
EST Estonia HIC ECA 4.0 20.7
ETH Ethiopia LIC SSA 2.2 22.0
FJI Fiji UMC EAP 2.7 11.0
FIN Finland HIC ECA 6.2 40.7
FRA France HIC ECA 8.7 16.3
GAB Gabon UMC SSA 2.9 13.0
GMB Gambia, The LIC SSA 2.8 10.3
GEO Georgia LMC ECA 1.7 8.0
DEU Germany HIC ECA 8.0 32.0
GHA Ghana LIC SSA 3.6 11.0
GRC Greece HIC ECA 5.9 14.7
GRD Grenada UMC LAC 3.7 22.3
GTM Guatemala LMC LAC 2.0 10.7
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World
Bank
Code World Bank Name
Income
Classification Region
Public
Health
Expenditure
(% of GDP)
Proportion
of Seats
Held by
Women in
National
Parliaments
GIN Guinea LIC SSA 0.7 19.0
GNB Guinea-Bissau LIC SSA 1.5 14.0
GUY Guyana LMC LAC 6.8 29.0
HTI Haiti LIC LAC 1.3 3.3
HND Honduras LMC LAC 3.8 23.0
HUN Hungary HIC ECA 5.4 10.3
ISL Iceland HIC ECA 8.5 32.7
IND India LMC SAS 1.1 8.3
IDN Indonesia LMC EAP 1.1 11.3
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. LMC MNA 3.1 3.7
IRQ Iraq LMC MNA 2.2 26.0
IRL Ireland HIC ECA 6.3 13.0
ISR Israel HIC ECA 4.5 14.0
ITA Italy HIC ECA 6.8 18.3
JAM Jamaica UMC LAC 2.3 12.7
JPN Japan HIC EAP 6.5 9.0
JOR Jordan LMC MNA 5.1 6.0
KAZ Kazakhstan UMC ECA 2.4 14.0
KEN Kenya LIC SSA 1.8 7.7
KIR Kiribati LMC EAP 13.7 5.0
KOR Korea, Rep. HIC EAP 3.5 13.3
KWT Kuwait HIC MNA 1.6 2.3
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic LIC ECA 3.3 8.7
LAO Lao PDR LIC EAP 0.7 25.0
LVA Latvia UMC ECA 3.9 19.3
LBN Lebanon UMC MNA 4.1 5.0
LSO Lesotho LMC SSA 3.7 20.3
LBR Liberia LIC SSA 2.9 13.0
LBY Libya UMC MNA 1.9 8.0
LTU Lithuania UMC ECA 4.5 23.3
LUX Luxembourg HIC ECA 6.5 23.0
MKD Macedonia, FYR UMC ECA 5.0 29.3
MDG Madagascar LIC SSA 2.8 7.7
MWI Malawi LIC SSA 6.9 13.7
MYS Malaysia UMC EAP 1.9 9.7
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World
Bank
Code World Bank Name
Income
Classification Region
Public
Health
Expenditure
(% of GDP)
Proportion
of Seats
Held by
Women in
National
Parliaments
MDV Maldives LMC SAS 7.0 12.0
MLI Mali LIC SSA 2.8 10.0
MLT Malta HIC ECA 6.0 9.0
MHL Marshall Islands LMC EAP 13.8 3.0
MRT Mauritania LIC SSA 1.6 20.0
MUS Mauritius UMC SSA 2.0 17.0
MEX Mexico UMC LAC 2.7 23.0
FSM Micronesia, Fed. Sts. LMC EAP 12.7 0.0
MDA Moldova LMC ECA 5.0 22.0
MCO Monaco HIC ECA 3.1 22.3
MNG Mongolia LMC EAP 3.2 4.7
MNE Montenegro UMC ECA 5.5 9.7
MAR Morocco LMC MNA 1.8 11.0
MOZ Mozambique LIC SSA 3.8 35.0
NAM Namibia UMC SSA 3.3 27.0
NPL Nepal LIC SAS 1.8 18.7
NLD Netherlands HIC ECA 7.4 37.7
NZL New Zealand HIC EAP 7.1 32.3
NIC Nicaragua LMC LAC 4.5 19.7
NER Niger LIC SSA 3.0 12.0
NGA Nigeria LMC SSA 1.7 6.7
NOR Norway HIC ECA 7.3 37.3
OMN Oman HIC MNA 1.9 0.7
PAK Pakistan LMC SAS 0.8 21.7
PLW Palau UMC EAP 8.5 0.0
PAN Panama UMC LAC 4.7 17.0
PNG Papua New Guinea LMC EAP 2.6 1.0
PRY Paraguay LMC LAC 2.6 11.0
PER Peru UMC LAC 2.6 29.0
PHL Philippines LMC EAP 1.3 19.7
POL Poland UMC ECA 4.5 20.0
PRT Portugal HIC ECA 7.1 23.3
QAT Qatar HIC MNA 2.8 0.0
ROM Romania UMC ECA 3.7 10.3
RUS Russian Federation UMC ECA 3.4 11.3
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Code World Bank Name
Income
Classification Region
Public
Health
Expenditure
(% of GDP)
Proportion
of Seats
Held by
Women in
National
Parliaments
RWA Rwanda LIC SSA 4.8 51.3
WSM Samoa LMC EAP 4.2 7.3
SMR San Marino HIC ECA 6.1 12.0
STP Sao Tome and Principe LMC SSA 5.3 3.7
SAU Saudi Arabia HIC MNA 2.7 0.0
SEN Senegal LIC SSA 3.2 21.0
SRB Serbia UMC ECA 6.0 18.0
SYC Seychelles UMC SSA 3.4 25.7
SLE Sierra Leone LIC SSA 1.3 13.7
SGP Singapore HIC EAP 1.1 23.7
SVK Slovak Republic HIC ECA 5.1 19.3
SVN Slovenia HIC ECA 5.7 12.3
SLB Solomon Islands LMC EAP 4.5 0.0
ZAF South Africa UMC SSA 3.5 33.0
ESP Spain HIC ECA 6.1 36.0
LKA Sri Lanka LMC SAS 1.9 5.3
KNA St. Kitts and Nevis UMC LAC 3.5 4.7
LCA St. Lucia UMC LAC 3.7 7.7
VCT St. Vincent & Grenadines UMC LAC 3.4 18.0
SDN Sudan LMC SSA 1.4 17.0
SUR Suriname UMC LAC 3.7 26.0
SWZ Swaziland LMC SSA 4.0 11.0
SWE Sweden HIC ECA 7.4 47.0
CHE Switzerland HIC ECA 6.3 28.0
SYR Syrian Arab Republic LMC MNA 1.7 12.0
TJK Tajikistan LIC ECA 1.2 18.0
TZA Tanzania LIC SSA 3.6 30.0
THA Thailand LMC EAP 2.7 10.5
TMP Timor-Leste LMC EAP 11.3 27.3
TGO Togo LIC SSA 1.6 9.0
TON Tonga LMC EAP 3.2 3.0
TTO Trinidad and Tobago HIC LAC 2.6 21.7
TUN Tunisia LMC MNA 3.0 23.0
TUR Turkey UMC ECA 3.5 7.3
TKM Turkmenistan LMC ECA 1.3 16.0
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Code World Bank Name
Income
Classification Region
Public
Health
Expenditure
(% of GDP)
Proportion
of Seats
Held by
Women in
National
Parliaments
UGA Uganda LIC SSA 1.6 30.3
UKR Ukraine LMC ECA 3.9 8.5
ARE United Arab Emirates HIC MNA 1.8 15.3
GBR United Kingdom HIC ECA 7.1 20.0
USA United States HIC NAM 7.2 16.0
URY Uruguay UMC LAC 6.4 11.3
UZB Uzbekistan LIC ECA 2.4 18.0
VUT Vanuatu LMC EAP 2.8 4.0
VEN Venezuela, RB UMC LAC 2.5 18.7
VNM Vietnam LIC EAP 2.6 26.3
YEM Yemen, Rep. LIC MNA 1.6 0.0
ZMB Zambia LIC SSA 3.7 15.0
ZWE Zimbabwe LIC SSA 4.3 16.0
Total: 185
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APPENDIX 2: TABLES: ADDITIONAL
REGRESSION ESTIMATES
REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT HEALTH EXPENDITURE AS
SHARE OF GDP ON WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT AND OTHER INDICATORS FOR ALL, LOW AND MIDDLE,
AND HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES, AVERAGE 2006-2008.
Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), All Countries
I II III IV V VI
Proportion of seats held by women in
national parliaments (%) 0.088*** 0.061*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.035*** 0.033***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005
international $) 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.075*** 0.003 0.015
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Probability
two randomly picked individuals belong to
different groups
-3.078*** -2.972*** -2.655*** -2.514***
(0.659) (0.674) (0.611) (0.573)
Openness: Total trade as a percentage of
GDP (constant prices) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Corruption Perceptions Index: (1, most to
10, least corrupt) 0.560*** 0.383***
(0.098) (0.099)
Level of democracy: +10, strongly
democratic to -10, strongly autocratic 0.086***
(0.019)
_cons 2.042*** 1.649*** 2.289*** 2.431*** 1.343*** 1.414***
(0.284) (0.250) (0.271) (0.329) (0.352) (0.330)
Number of observations 146 146 146 146 146 146
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International, Penn World Table, The
Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al. (2009)
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Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), Low and Middle-Income Countries
I II III IV V VI
Proportion of seats held by women in
national parliaments (%) 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.035***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005
international $) 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.080*** 0.020 0.017
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.031) (0.030)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Probability
two randomly picked individuals belong to
different groups
-1.855*** -1.992*** -1.800*** -1.765***
(0.660) (0.645) (0.615) (0.591)
Openness: Total trade as a percentage of
GDP (constant prices) 0.008** 0.007** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Corruption Perceptions Index: (1, most to
10, least corrupt) 0.469*** 0.346***
(0.132) (0.133)
Level of democracy: +10, strongly
democratic to -10, strongly autocratic 0.061***
(0.020)
_cons 2.221*** 1.807*** 2.219*** 1.585*** 0.507 0.606
(0.253) (0.273) (0.302) (0.386) (0.475) (0.458)
Number of observations 110 110 110 110 110 110
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International, Penn World Table, The
Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.
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Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), High Income Countries
I II III IV V VI
Proportion of seats held by women in
national parliaments (%) 0.106*** 0.111*** 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.054** 0.028
(0.027) (0.028) (0.022) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021)
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005
international $) -0.024 -0.007 -0.002 -0.037 0.005
(0.035) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Probability
two randomly picked individuals belong to
different groups
-7.063*** -5.509*** -4.969*** -4.310***
(1.434) (1.533) (1.384) (1.191)
Openness: Total trade as a percentage of
GDP (constant prices) -0.008** -0.008** -0.006**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Corruption Perceptions Index: (1, most to
10, least corrupt) 0.445*** 0.269**
(0.151) (0.137)
Level of democracy: +10, strongly
democratic to -10, strongly autocratic 0.140***
(0.039)
_cons 3.216*** 3.834*** 4.544*** 4.997*** 4.004*** 3.126***
(0.641) (1.125) (0.873) (0.852) (0.834) (0.751)
Number of observations 36 36 36 36 36 36
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency International, Penn World Table, The
Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.
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APPENDIX 3. DO-FILE FOR STATA ESTIMATIONS
Do files for merging, tables and graphs are left out.
cd "/Users/geirlie/Desktop/Gender/data"
use gender.dta, replace
*Genereate variables to mean
*egen temp=mean(elf), by(wbcode)
*replace temp=. if year!=2008
*command to move the ELF data from 2009 to 2008 in the dataset so we can use the same
commands as the other var in the do file
*ELF 2009 data are for many different years, but collected in one year
*drop elf
*ren temp elf
*Get GDP PC PPP to be in thousands units instead of "raw units" e.g. before: Norway 2008
49711.35 after 49.711. This makes it easier to interpret the coeficcient in the regression
replace gdppcppp=gdppcppp/1000
foreach var of varlist polity2-ghegdp {
egen a`var'=mean(`var') if year>=2006 & year<=2008, by(wbcode)
}
****LABEL AVG INDICATORS to use var names in reg output
label variable aghegdp "Health expenditure, public (% of GDP)"
label variable aparliament "Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)"
label variable agdppcppp "GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $)"
label variable acpi "Corruption Perceptions Index: (1, most to 10, least corrupt)"
label variable apolity2 "Level of democracy: +10, strongly democratic to -10, strongly
autocratic"
label variable aopenk "Openness: Total trade as a percentage of GDP, (constant prices)"
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label variable aelf "Ethnolinguistic fractionalization:Probability two randomly picked
individuals belong to different groups"
*label variable aelf "ELF(1) Fractionalization measured at different levels of linguistic
aggregation"
label variable elf "Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Probability two randomly picked
individuals belong to different groups"
label variable agini "Gini index"
label variable acpia "CPIA gender equality rating (1=low to 6=high)"
label variable agem "Gender Empowerment Measure (Value)"
egen country=group(wbcode)
xtset country year
*ALL COUNTRIES_____Regressions, cross country comparsion
*Controlling for determinants of government health spending
estimates clear
reg aghegdp aparliament if year==2008
estimates store I
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp if year==2008
estimates store II
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf if year==2008
estimates store III
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf aopenk if year==2008
estimates store IV
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf aopenk acpi if year==2008
estimates store V
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf aopenk acpi apolity2 if year==2008
estimates store VI
erase tableall.xml
xml_tab I II III IV V VI, append stats (r2 r2_a N) sd below font("Book Antiqua" 8) ///
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title("Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), All Countries") sheet(table I,
nogridlines) save(/Users/geirlie/Desktop/Gender/data/tableall) ///
notes("Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency
International, Penn World Table, The Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.")
*LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES_____Regressions, cross country comparsion
estimates clear
reg aghegdp aparliament if year==2008 & classification!="HIC"
estimates store I
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp if year==2008 & classification!="HIC"
estimates store II
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf if year==2008 & classification!="HIC"
estimates store III
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf aopenk if year==2008 & classification!="HIC"
estimates store IV
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf aopenk acpi if year==2008 & classification!="HIC"
estimates store V
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf aopenk acpi apolity2 if year==2008 &
classification!="HIC"
estimates store VI
*erase tableall.xml
xml_tab I II III IV V VI, append stats (r2 r2_a N) sd below font("Book Antiqua" 8) ///
title("Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), Low and Middle-Income
Countries") sheet(table I, nogridlines) save(/Users/geirlie/Desktop/Gender/data/tablelic) ///
notes("Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency
International, Penn World Table, The Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.")
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*HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES_____Regressions, cross country comparsion
estimates clear
reg aghegdp aparliament if year==2008 & classification=="HIC"
estimates store I
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp if year==2008 & classification=="HIC"
estimates store II
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf if year==2008 & classification=="HIC"
estimates store III
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf aopenk if year==2008 & classification=="HIC"
estimates store IV
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf aopenk acpi if year==2008 & classification=="HIC"
estimates store V
reg aghegdp aparliament agdppcppp aelf aopenk acpi apolity2 if year==2008 &
classification=="HIC"
estimates store VI
xml_tab I II III IV V VI, append stats (r2 r2_a N) sd below font("Book Antiqua" 8) ///
title("Dependent Variable: Health Expenditure, Public (% of GDP), High Income Countries")
sheet(table I, nogridlines) save(/Users/geirlie/Desktop/Gender/data/tablehic) ///
notes("Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency
International, Penn World Table, The Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al.")
*_______________
*Regressions, WITHIN COUNTRIES EFFECT,
cd "/Users/geirlie/Desktop/Gender/data"
use gender.dta, replace
label variable ghegdp "Health expenditure, public (% of GDP)"
label variable parliament "Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)"
label variable gdppcppp "GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $)"
label variable cpi "Corruption Perceptions Index: (1, most to 10, least corrupt)"
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label variable polity2 "Level of democracy: +10, strongly democratic to -10, strongly
autocratic"
label variable openk "Openness: Total trade as a percentage of GDP, (constant prices)"
egen country=group(wbcode)
xtset country year
estimates clear
replace gdppcppp=gdppcppp/1000
*ALL COUNTRIES
xtreg ghegdp parliament, fe
estimates store I
xtreg ghegdp parliament year, fe
estimates store II
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp, fe
estimates store III
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp cpi, fe
estimates store IV
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp cpi polity2, fe
estimates store V
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp cpi polity2 openk, fe
estimates store VI
xml_tab I II III IV V VI, append stats (r2 r2_a N) sd below font("Book Antiqua" 8) ///
title("Dependent variable: Health expenditure, public (% of GDP), All countries") sheet(table I,
nogridlines) save(/Users/geirlie/Desktop/Gender/data/tableall-fe) ///
notes("Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency
International, Penn World Table, The Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al. (2009)")
estimates clear
**LOW AND MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES
56
xtreg ghegdp parliament if classification!="HIC", fe
estimates store I
xtreg ghegdp parliament year if classification!="HIC", fe
estimates store II
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp if classification!="HIC", fe
estimates store III
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp cpi if classification!="HIC", fe
estimates store IV
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp cpi polity2 if classification!="HIC", fe
estimates store V
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp cpi polity2 openk if classification!="HIC", fe
estimates store VI
xml_tab I II III IV V VI, append stats (r2 r2_a N) sd below font("Book Antiqua" 8) ///
title("Dependent variable: Health expenditure, public (% of GDP), Low and middle income
countries") sheet(table I, nogridlines) save(/Users/geirlie/Desktop/Gender/data/tablelic-fe)
///
notes("Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency
International, Penn World Table, The Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al. (2009)")
estimates clear
*HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES
xtreg ghegdp parliament if classification=="HIC", fe
estimates store I
xtreg ghegdp parliament year if classification=="HIC", fe
estimates store II
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp if classification=="HIC", fe
estimates store III
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp cpi if classification=="HIC", fe
estimates store IV
xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp cpi polity2 if classification=="HIC", fe
estimates store V
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xtreg ghegdp parliament year gdppcppp cpi polity2 openk if classification=="HIC", fe
estimates store VI
xml_tab I II III IV V VI, append stats (r2 r2_a N) sd below font("Book Antiqua" 8) ///
title("Dependent variable: Health expenditure, public (% of GDP), high income countries")
sheet(table I, nogridlines) save(/Users/geirlie/Desktop/Gender/data/tablehic-fe) ///
notes("Source: World Health Organization, World Bank, United Nations, Transparency
International, Penn World Table, The Center for Systemic Peace, Desmet et al. (2009)")
